By Adnan Khan
Janes intel�li�gence, the pres�ti�gious global secu�rity firm released new data recently that high�lighted the num�ber of oper�a�tions con�ducted by ISIS and the Bashar al-Assad regime. It found around 64% of ver�i�fi�able ISISattacks in Syria this year (Novem�ber 21 2013 � Novem�ber 21 2014) tar�geted other rebel groups. Just 13% of ISIS attacks dur�ing the same period tar�geted al-Assad�s forces. It also found al-Assad�s coun�tert�er�ror�ism oper�a�tions, more than two-thirds of which were airstrikes, skewed heav�ily towards groups whose names were not ISIS. Of 982 coun�tert�er�ror�ism oper�a�tions for the year, just 6% directly tar�geted ISIS.[1] ISISactions ever since its emer�gence has led to much sus�pi�cion of coor�di�na�tion between them and the Syr�ian regime. At RO we con�tinue to receive numer�ous ques�tions on the pos�si�bil�ity of ISIS being a US proxy and the sus�pi�cion of col�lu�sion between ISIS and the al-Assad regime. Due to this we thought it would be a good time to analyse such claims, espe�cially now that empir�i�cal evi�dence exists of ISIS and al-Assad�s forces mainly avoid�ing each other.
The ori�gin of ISIS is rather murky and is prob�a�bly the rea�son many have sus�pi�cions over them. All of the senior lead�ers of ISIS were gath�ered in Camp Bucca in 2004 in the midst of the insur�gency against coali�tion troops dur�ing the Iraq war. The UK�s guardian con�ducted an exclu�sive and lengthy insight into ISIS on 11 Decem�ber 2014 and inter�viewed senior ISIS com�man�ders. ISIS com�man�der, Abu Ahmed con�firmed the US-run prison pro�vided an extra�or�di�nary oppor�tu�nity. �We could never have all got together like this in Bagh�dad, or any�where else. It would have been impos�si�bly dan�ger�ous. Here, we were not only safe, but we were only a few hun�dred metres away from the entire al-Qaida lead�er�ship.�[2] Abu Ahmed explained how Camp Bucca was organ�ised. Most of Baghdadi�s fel�low pris�on�ers � some 24,000 men, were divided into 24 camps. The prison was run along strictly hier�ar�chi�cal lines, down to a Teletubbies-like uni�form colour scheme which allowed jail�ers and cap�tives alike to recog�nise each detainee�s place in the peck�ing order. As ISIS ram�paged through the region, it has been led by men who spent time in US deten�tion cen�tres dur�ing the Amer�i�can occu�pa�tion of Iraq. Accord�ing to Hisham al-Hashimi, the Baghdad-based ana�lyst, the Iraqi gov�ern�ment esti�mates that 17 of the 25 most impor�tant Islamic State lead�ers run�ning the war in Iraq and Syria spent time in US pris�ons between 2004 and 2011.[3]
By Decem�ber 2004, Bagh�dadi was deemed by his jail�ers to pose no fur�ther risk and his release was autho�rised. �He was respected very much by the US army,� Abu Ahmed said. �If he wanted to visit peo�ple in another camp he could, but we couldn�t.[4] Effec�tively in prison, all of ISIS�s princes were meet�ing reg�u�larly. The most impor�tant peo�ple in Bucca were those who had been close to Zar�qawi. But the ques�tion remains how ISIS shifted from a a gang in prison to the worlds pre�mier mil�i�tant organ�i�sa�tion?This is where Sad�dam Hussain�s Ba�athists came into the equa�tion, who lost every�thing when Sad�dam was ousted. By 2008 meet�ings between those who would form ISIS and the Ba�athists became fre�quent. In the Guardian insight Abu Ahmed, a senior com�man�der of ISIS con�firmed: �these meet�ings had become far more fre�quent � and many of them were tak�ing place in Syria.�[5] Bashar al-Assad has a long his�tory of arm�ing and sup�port�ing Jihadi groups, for its own strate�gic inter�ests. In May 2006, the US Depart�ment of Defence quar�terly report, titled �Mea�sur�ing Sta�bil�ity and Secu�rity in Iraq,� out�lined: ��. Syria con�tin�ues to pro�vide safe haven, bor�der tran�sit, and lim�ited logis�ti�cal sup�port to some Iraqi insur�gents, espe�cially for�mer Saddam-era Iraqi Baath Party ele�ments. Syria also per�mits for�mer regime ele�ments to engage in orga�ni�za�tional activ�i�ties, such that Syria has emerged as an impor�tant orga�ni�za�tional and coor�di�na�tion hub for ele�ments of the for�mer Iraqi regime. Although Syr�ian secu�rity and intel�li�gence ser�vices con�tinue to detain and deport Iraq-bound fight�ers, Syria remains the pri�mary for�eign fighter gate�way into Iraq��[6]
There is more damn�ing evi�dence of Syr�ian regime-ISIS col�lu�sion. The Guardian inter�viewed Major Gen�eral Hus�sein Ali Kamal, the direc�tor of intel�li�gence in Iraq, reg�u�larly, until his death in early 2014. One of his duties was to secure Bagh�dad against ter�ror attacks. Kamal, who was diag�nosed with can�cer in 2012 and died ear�lier this year, autho�rised the Guardian jour�nal�ist to pub�lish details of their con�ver�sa�tions. The Guardian jour�nal�ist con�firmed when he first met Kamal in 2009, he was por�ing over tran�scripts of record�ings that had been made at two secret meet�ings in Zabadani, near Dam�as�cus, in the spring of 2009. Kemal con�firmed in his inter�view with the Guardian that Iraqi jihadists, Syr�ian offi�cials and Ba�athists from both coun�tries from Iraq and Syria were brought together: �We had a source in the room wear�ing a wire at the meet�ing in Zabadani. He is the most sen�si�tive source we have ever had. As far as we know, this is the first time there has been a strate�gic level meet�ing between all of these groups. It marks a new point in his�tory.�[7] In March 2010, Iraqi forces, arrested an ISIS leader named Munaf Abdul Rahim al-Rawi, who was revealed to be one of the group�s main com�man�ders in Bagh�dad, and one of the very few peo�ple who had access to the group�s then leader, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. Iraq�s three main intel�li�gence bod�ies, con�spired to get a lis�ten�ing device and GPS loca�tion tracker in a flower box deliv�ered to Abu Omar�s hide�out. Abu Omar�s hide�out had no inter�net con�nec�tions or tele�phone lines � all impor�tant mes�sages were car�ried in and out by only three men. One of them was Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The deaths of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayub al-Masri vacated posi�tions that were quickly filled by the alumni of Camp Bucca � whose upper ech�e�lons had begun prepar�ing for this moment since their time in jail in south�ern Iraq. �For us it was an acad�emy,� Abu Ahmed said, �but for them� � the senior lead�ers � �it was a man�age�ment school. There wasn�t a void at all, because so many peo�ple had been men�tored in prison.[8]
ISIS rise to infamy was its con�quest of Mosul. Mosul, Iraq�s largest city after Bagh�dad is the provin�cial cap�i�tal and boasts a pop�u�la�tion of around 1.8 mil�lion. The maths was sim�ple. The Iraqi army had 250,000 troops, its enemy, ISIS, had some�where around 1,500. The Iraqi army had tanks, planes, and Amer�i�can train�ing. ISIS had never fielded a tank or a plane. In Mosul two army divi�sions were sta�tioned in Mosul. This was around 30,000 troops, there were also 10,000 fed�eral police, 30,000 local police and likely, some Iran�ian Quds Force offi�cers. The ques�tion is how a force 15 times larger than the 1,500 indi�vid�u�alsISIS could muster defeated? Iraqi army offi�cials were aware of an impend�ing attack by ISIS. Lieu�tenant Gen�eral Mahdi Gharawi, the oper�a�tional com�man�der of Nin�eveh province, of which Mosul is the cap�i�tal, con�firmed in mul�ti�ple inter�views that in late May 2014, Iraqi secu�rity forces arrested seven mem�bers of ISIS in Mosul and learned the group planned an offen�sive on the city in early June. Gharawi, asked Prime Min�is�ter Nuri al-Maliki�s most trusted com�man�ders for rein�force�ments. Senior offi�cers scoffed at the request.[9]
The attack on Mosul began on 6 June 2014, ISIS attacked Mosul from the north�west in con�voys of pickup trucks. Bat�tles inside the city pro�ceeded for 3 days until sol�diers deserted and fled. There are how�ever many sol�diers and secu�rity per�son�nel, who in inter�views con�firmed, they did not desert � they were ordered to with�draw. Amir al-Saadi, a sol�dier from one of the Iraqi Army�s divi�sions in Mosul out�lined what hap�pened: �The army with�drew from Mosul and that with�drawal is the respon�si�bil�ity of the senior com�man�ders. The offi�cer in charge was sit�ting in his office when I came in with some other sol�diers. He told us he had received orders to with�draw from the city as quickly as pos�si�ble. When he said that, we really thought he was jok�ing. But he wasn�t. So we went out and told the oth�ers about the orders. That was when we started leav�ing the base, after chang�ing out of our uni�forms into civil�ian clothes.�[10] Lieu�tenant Gen�eral Mahdi Gharawi con�firmed only three peo�ple could have given the final order: Aboud Qan�bar, at the time the defence ministry�s deputy chief of staff; Ali Ghaidan, then com�man�der of the ground forces; or Maliki him�self, who per�son�ally directed his most senior offi�cers from Bagh�dad. The secret of who decided to aban�don Mosul, Gharawi says, lies with these three men. Gharawi says a deci�sion by Ghaidan and Qan�bar to leave Mosul�s west�ern bank sparked mass deser�tions as sol�diers assumed their com�man�ders had fled. All the evi�dence points towards Mosul not being deserted, but orders being received by sol�diers to leave the city, but also to leave their equip�ment behind. Malaki, since he emerged as Iraq�s pre�mier, con�sol�i�dated and cen�tralised all the key min�istries and depart�ments into his per�sonal office, there�fore the deci�sion to aban�don the city could only have come from Malaki him�self. This would weaken his stand�ing con�sid�er�ably in Iraq and espe�cially from his Shi�ah sup�port base. He would only have done this if the pres�sure came from the US, as no-one had so much influ�ence to force Malaki into a deci�sion such as this. ISIS has frac�tured the insur�gency in Syria through its actions since its announce�ment of a so-called �Caliphate�. The weapons and equip�ment and money attained from Mosul were the cat�a�lyst for this.
ISIS�s actions ever since it announced its �Caliphate� has caused a frac�ture in rebel unity. This is because the ISIS state is pred�i�cated on an exclu�sion�ary method of gov�er�nance. ISIS main�tains social con�trol by elim�i�nat�ing all resis�tance. Many reports com�ing out from Mosul and in Syria are of descent being dealt with through pun�ish�ments, includ�ing death. Bagh�dadi said the fol�low�ing about the Shi�ah: �Al Qaeda wants to forge links with the Shi�ites. They think the Shi�ites are their broth�ers even though they make tak�fir on all the sahabah and they believe the Quran is cor�rupted. Yet al Qaeda wants to forge links with them. When Isis takes a town either you leave shism or die. Isis can�not take jizya from them. They are a newly invented reli�gion so no jizya can be taken from them.� Imple�ment�ing Islam includes their under�stand�ing of the creed and as a result many have been accused of apos�tasy for tak�ing dif�fer�ent posi�tions to them. Based on this, courts have been set up and any oppo�si�tion to ISIS rule or ver�dicts has been viewed as rebel�lion and has seen indi�vid�u�als and groups pun�ished with exe�cu�tion. When all the rebel groups were fight�ing the al-Assad regime and launch�ing attacks on Dam�as�cus, ISIS focused on con�quer�ing ter�ri�tory, rather than fight�ing the al-Assad regime.
Many have long sus�pected col�lu�sion between al-Assad and ISIS. Analy�sis of the JTIC data�base on a regional level showed that there were 238 coun�tert�er�ror�ism oper�a�tions in Aleppo for the year through Nov. 21 � but just 14 of those tar�geted ISIS. In the ISIS strong�hold of Raqqa, there were 22 coun�tert�er�ror�ism oper�a�tions but just half tar�geted ISIS. ISIS have spent most of the last few months fight�ing in Kaboni, which has very lit�tle strate�gic value and has zero al-Assad regime pres�ence, rather than fac�ing off in Aleppo which is under intense regime attack. Yusuf Abu Abdul�lah, one of the lead�ers of the Al-Mujaheddin Army in Aleppo, said when his fight�ers have attacked regime bases, they have come under sep�a�rate attacks from ISIS. That�s forced them to with�draw and bat�tle ISIS instead of Assad�s forces. Al-Assad�s air force not tar�get�ing the large camps oper�ated by ISIS in sev�eral parts of the coun�try, has been con�stantly pointed out by those on the receiv�ing end of air attacks[11] and many defec�tors from the al-Assad army have pointed out sev�eral field com�man�ders of ISIS were for�mer mil�i�tary or intel�li�gence offi�cers of the Syr�ian army. Oil and gas sales between ISIS and the al-Assad regime has also been a reg�u�lar occurrence.[12]
The US incur�sion back into Iraq and then to Syria has been very dubi�ous. ISIS started from Iraq and has been con�stantly stream�ing across the Iraq-Syria bor�der, they have been mov�ing sup�plies in con�voys of trucks but have not been tar�geted by the US. The US gave ISIS cover when it con�ducted strikes in Syria against a new dubi�ous group known as �Kho�rasan,� which offi�cials say was plot�ting an immi�nent attack onUS soil. Bizarrely, the his�tory of the Kho�rasan was vir�tu�ally non-existent, and US offi�cials never men�tioned the group until the week before the strikes began in Syria. Esti�mated at 50 fight�ers, the group sud�denly became a huge pre�text for mil�i�tary inter�ven�tion, even though an air sor�tie on Sep�tem�ber 23rd 2014 report�edly killed 30 of them.[13] Andrew McCarthy, a for�mer US fed�eral ter�ror�ism pros�e�cu�tor high�lighted in the National Review mag�a�zine: �You haven�t heard of the Kho�rasan group because there isn�t one. It is a name the admin�is�tra�tion came up with cal�cu�lat�ing that Kho�rasan had suf�fi�cient con�nec�tion to jihadist lore [so] that no one would call the Pres�i�dent on it.�[14] Harakat Hazm high�lighted the airstrikes were a sig�nif�i�cant US effort to destroy Jab�hut al-Nusra, and a minus�cule effort to destroy ISIS, and no effort at all to destroy al-Assad. This is very sig�nif�i�cant as Harakat Hazm, which is allied with the CIA-backed Free Syr�ian Army, was one of the first rebel groups to receive US anti-tank mis�siles. That effec�tively makes it one of America�s most trusted sup�posed allies in the Syr�ian conflict.
The US has attempted to thwart the upris�ing in Syria from the very first day it began. Whilst it was able to divert the other upris�ings in the wider Arab spring, it has failed to do so in Syria where the peo�ple have main�tained their Islamic ori�en�ta�tion in almost apoc�a�lyp�tic con�di�tions. Unable to cob�ble together a loyal oppo�si�tion, US pris�on�ers went on to estab�lish ISIS which has achieved much more than the US was able to ever achieve. ISIS pri�or�ity in Syria has been their con�quest of ter�ri�tory rather than fight�ing the al-Assad regime, which has weak�ened the rebel oppo�si�tion against al-Assad. Dur�ing this period al-Assad has been sit�ting back and watch�ing the rebels fight amongst each other in the north of Syria and launch�ing strikes when the oppor�tu�nity arises against a weak�ened rebel front. There is only one entity that has ben�e�fited from the rise of ISIS and what they have achieved and that is the US who was strug�gling in thwart�ing the upris�ing in Syria.
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